trade theory to break with the Ricardian assumption of factor immobility between countries. During the 1960s a body of literature developed which conskbered the implications of foreign investment for home and host countries, stemming from McDougall's seminal article on 'The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad'.1 This corpus I shall refer to as the neoclassical theory of DFI. The basic conclusion of this approach is that, in general, foreign investment is beneficial to the host country, in the sense that it increases income accruing to that country, and should be encouraged.2 Within such a framework, it is difficult to see what role can be played by bargaining by the host country government. It is necessary therefore to begin with a critique of the empirical validity of the assumptions on which the neoclassical theory is based. In the first place, perfect competition is assumed, and, where it is discussed at all, only lip-service is paid to the need to recognize the predominance of oligopoly. In practice, foreign investment is closely associated with oligopoly. The bulk of the main capitalist countries' overseas investment is accounted for by a relatively small number of firms. Between 250 and 300 US firms account for more than 70 per cent of that country's investment, while in the United Kingdom 165 firms control 80 per cent, and in West Germany 82 firms control 70 per cent, of all foreign investment.3 Moreover, many studies have shown that foreign investment tends to be particularly heavy in the more oligopolistic sectors of industry. The second assumption, which is implicit rather than explicit, is the identification of foreign investment with the export of capital. In fact this 2 In a subsequent note Kemp showed that in fact there may be a case for a tax on foreign investment analogous to the optimum tariff in international trade. Set Kemp in Dunning, op. cit. 3 UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development, p. 7. assumption is more appropriate to the model of portfolio investment than that of direct foreign investment. It is by now clear that direct foreign investment comes in the form of a package which includes technology, and management as well as capital. Indeed, the package may include very little capital, since multinational corporations often prefer to raise capital locally rather than export it from the parent company.4 Hirschman5 has indicated that this identification with capital movements has been an important source of bias in the literature on foreign investment, particularly in underdeveloped countries. As long as investment is considered as a movement of capital to a capital-short country, its beneficial effects as a complement to local resources are highlighted. Once direct foreign investment is recognized as a package, the possibility that it may have an adverse effect is more evident. A further assumption, related to the two previous ones, is that of perfect knowledge. Yet the fact that neither of the previous assumptions holds makes nonsense of perfect knowledge. The oligopoly position of the major multinational corporations is based, at least in part, on their control of information through patents and industrial secrets. Moreover, once it is accepted that foreign investment involves a package which includes technology as well as capital, the nature of the technology market as a market in information must be taken into account. In this market information cannot be freely available. A related assumption is that of certainty of expectations (or at least that all alternatives can be reduced to certainty equivalents). The recognition of oligopoly invalidates this assumption too, since the interdependence of firms' behaviour introduces an element of uncertainty which cannot be reduced to certainty equivalents. The fact that they operate in an uncertain environment is an important element in understanding the strategies of multinational corporations in the area of foreign investment.
An alternative analysis of direct foreign investment which emphasizes both the package nature of such investment and the importance of monopoly has been developed by Vaitsos6, taking as a starting point the 'product cycle' theory of international trade and investment. The technological lead of certain firms enables them to earn monopoly rents. Foreign investment is a way of attempting to preserve this monopoly position. The collective nature of the inputs is a way of extending the monopoly to parts of the package where, taken singly, a monopoly position would not operate. The existence of such monopoly rents opens up the possibility of bargaining between host governments and multinational corporations.
Strategic Considerations in Bargaining with MNCs
The neo-classical theory of foreign investment implies that arty proposal from a multinational corporation which, on a cost-benefit analysis, shows a positive net value, should be undertaken. The implicit alternative is that of no foreign investment and therefore no project. The bargaining model implies that a positive net present value is not a sufficient criterion for accepting the investment for two reasons: first, because the alternative may not be no project but investment by another foreign company, or undertaking the project without direct foreign investment; second, because it may be possible, through negotiation, to increase the net present value of the original project. Once it has been recognized that foreign investment is not a matter of take it or leave it, as the neo-classical model implies, but involves the negotiation of a package which includes a large number of distinct elements such as profit remissions, royalty payments, tax treatments, tariff protection, local content requirements, export earnings, training of local labour, etc., the strategic factors in the host government's bargaining position must be considered. The acquisition of technology which is available from a number of suppliers obviously presents a different picture from the case where it is tightly controlled by one firm. Most of the technology required by LDCs will be of the former type so that the competitive structure (at an international level) of the industry which is being considered may be an important element in the negotiating position of the recipient. The more tight-knit the oligopoly within the industry, the more likely it is that firms will achieve some kind of collusion when faced with a government that is prepared to negotiate the terms which it considers to be most beneficial. On the other hand, in an industry in which the oligopoly is less stable as a result of a 6 C. V. Vaitsos, Intercountry Income Distribution and Transnational Enterprises, Clarndc'ts Press, Oxford, 1974. 22 lower level of concentration, or a recent new entry, there will be more scope for bargaining. A second factor which will influence the strength of the bargaining position of the participants will be the alternatives which face the host government in terms of its ability either to undertake the project without any assistance from abroad, or to rely on imports to supply the products concerned. The former is related to the level of technological development of the host country. The latter depends on the strategic importance of the industry both in terms of desirability of local production and the foreign exchange cost of continued dependence on imports which determine the feasibility of such a strategy.
There are a number of further strategic considerations which can be controlled, at least in part, by host governments. One of the deficiencies of early attempts at control of foreign investment has been the piecemeal way in which such policies have been applied. This is to a large extent an organizational problem, deriving from the fact that a number of government agencies may be involved in determining various aspects of policy which affect the MNC, e.g. a royalties committee, the finance ministry, the foreign ministry. A firm's ability to remit the profits may be affected by all of these agencies since each deals with a different channel of remission. It is essential, therefore, to have a co-ordinated policy so that the effect of more stringent controls on royalty payments, for instance, will not simply be a higher level of transfer pricing.
A key element in any process of negotiation is information. The greater the information which a host government possesses about a company's operations the flore likely it is to be able to estimate the margin within which it must settle and the most favourable terms which can be obtained from the foreign firm. There is, however, a cost involved in the search for information, and this sets limits to the extent to which it will be con-in return for a guaranteed rate of return. The government may be prepared to accept such an arrangement because of its effects on the balance of payments.
Inter-governmental co-operation is an important element in successful negotiation in the extractive industries but less so in the case of manufacturing investment, where the key factor in the bargaining position of the host country is access to the country's domestic market. In extractive industries the key element is access to a natural resource which may also be available elsewhere. Nevertheless, producer organizations such as OPEC have also played a role in the dissemination of information among member countries, for example, concerning the terms which have been negotiated with other governments. This strengthens the bargaining position of the producer country. A danger to be avoided in negotiating the admission of foreign investment is to regard this as a once-for-all affair. There must be a system for continuous policing of the agreement, and also the possibilities of termination or renegotiation. This is vital since the agreement should be seen as a means of developing a local technological capacity which will either render it ultimately unnecessary or enable renegotiation on terms more favourable to the host government. Thus the and making compensatory exports of certain simple parts such as radiators and springs. The industry was therefore essentially an assembly industry. The major mechanical and body parts were all imported.
During the 1960s some rationalization of the motor industry had occurred as a result of the government's policy of increasing local content requirements, and the number of firms had been halved. By the late I 960s, however, the limits of such a policy had been reached without anything like the volume of production required to take to obtain the necessary efficiency in the industry in order to be able to exchange with LAFTA and the Andean Pact without losses for the country and within the competitive margin."8 It was decided that the most appropriate way of achieving these ends was to open the industry to international bidding. The broad outlines of the form which the development of the industry should take were laid down in June 1971. The number of models was to be restricted to one small car less than 1200cc and its commercial vehicle derivative (Category A), one medium-sized car of between 1300 and 2000cc and its commercial vehicle derivative (Category B), and a chassis with diesel engine for a 6-8 ton lorry and a bus chassis based on the same mechanical parts (Category C). It was planned to produce 40,000 vehicles in 1973 rising to 100,000 by 1980, distributed as follows between the three categories:
In terms of its international market structure the motor industry was particularly favourable from the point of view of the host country's bargaining position. Although oligopolistic, with less than a dozen firms dominating the industry all round the world, it is still a highly competitive industry partly because of the challenge to US dominance by the major European and Japanese manufacturers. In the past, this competitiveness, combined with the liberal policies adopted by most LDCs towards foreign investment, has led to the frag- (although some writers argued at the time that the demand projections, on which the plans for the motor industry were based, were in fact incompatible with the government's declared income redistribution objectives).9 Nevertheless, the division of the car market into two categories, small and medium-sized, did provide the government with some room for manoeuvre. When in February 1972 the results of the first round of bidding were announced, Category B was not allocated to any firm, since none of the offers reached the required standard. The government then declared its intention to meet the demand for the medium-sized cars by imports, but better offers were subsequently received from the companies, and the category was finally awarded to Peugeot. Thus, over a limited sector of the market, the Unidad Popular Government was able to use the threat of withholding access to the market in order to obtain a better bargain. The Chilean case also illustrates the difficulties of retaining bargaining within the sector concerned and the problem of political pressure on the host government. The decision to grant the contract for producing a lorry and bus chassis to the Spanish firm Pegaso was much criticized. Originally Category C was awarded to Fiat with Pegaso in second place. It had been argued that the vehicle which Pegaso proposed to produce was unsuitable for local conditions and that 
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Spanish Government to import grain at a time when the country was going through a grave political and economic crisis in October 1972, as a result of the lorry-owner's strike, was an important factor in signing the contract with Pegaso, It is also significant that Pegaso obtained much more favourable terms than Citroen and Peugeot who had already signed contracts in the two car categories. This was less a reflection of differences in the bargaining power of the companies concerned than of the changed economic and political situation which faced the Chilean government by the time the latter contract came to be signed. lion was one manner of ensuring a flow of in formation once the companies were in operation Similarly the need for continuing control of the multinational corporations was also partly met by majority ownership and by the fact that eight of the Il directors, including the managing director, were to be appointed by CORFO and the firm's workers. The original contracts were to cover a ten-year period, after which they could be renegotiated or terminated by the government buying out the minority shareholders. This provided some room for manoeuvre for the government at the end of ten years.
Conclusion
The coup of September 1973 makes it impossible to assess the success of the policy followed by the Unidad Popular Government in the motor industry, and in any event such an exercise would be beyond the scope of this paper. But the case of the Chilean motor industry negotiations does illustrate the scope that exists for bargaining between host governments and multinational corporations. Contrary to the implications of the neo-classical model, government policy towards foreign investment is not simply a matter of deciding whether it is a good thing or not. Host country relations with multinational corporations involve a whole complex of issues and require an integrated approach.
